Originally published in the Literary Review of Canada.

Givanni B. Sala, *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge*. Translated by Joseph Spoerl. Edited by Robert M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994

Bernard Lonergan was, above all, a philosopher and theologian of subjectivity. While the Roman church has generally grounded its theology in fundamental creedal propositions, Lonergan bases his instead on an analysis of experience in all its many varieties, including religious consciousness. It is this change of fundamentals that constitutes the real significance of Lonergan's beginning his programme with the thesis he presents in *Insight* (1958), his painstaking analysis of cognitional process which serves, in part, as a prolegomena to *Method in Theology* (1972); and he points up the founding role of *Insight*'s thesis to his more strictly theological enterprise when, at various points in *Method in Theology*, he summarizes the findings of the earlier work.

Just how fundamental this shift is we can gauge by considering the place mystical theology, which gives articulation to the religious consciousness in its ecstatic modes, had in the Catholic theological tradition. The role that tradition accorded to mystical theology was, essentially, to confirm the Catholic faith's fundamental creedal propositions, the truths of which its foundational theology systematized, reconciled and elaborated. Thus, it considered religious experience not as founding the propositions of theology, but as offering support, piecemeal, to this or that element of dogma or doctrine.

Lonergan proposes that theology has a different foundation: the basis for theology, Lonergan proclaims, is not a set propositions whose founding role for faith gives them the status of dogma; rather it is the experience of actual living persons possessing a dimension of depth which religion addresses. Foundational theology, in Lonergan's view, does not have the role of elaborating and systematizing fundamental creedal propositions, but of expounding the nature of the subject whose most profound needs and aspirations imbue those propositions with their depth of meaning. But if the lived experience of actual persons is the foundation for theology, then a comprehensive understanding of consciousness as a whole is required to locate religious consciousness within the larger map of consciousness. This is the motivation for the analysis of subject that Lonergan offers in *Insight*.

Lonergan focuses his analysis of consciousness upon cognition, partly because cognition is the purpose of consciousness and, according to the classical view, to understand the essence of a thing one must apprehend it through the purpose it serves, and partly because the cognitional process aspires to an ever more comprehensive vision, since it is driven by a dynamism that aspires towards complete intelligibility and complete truth—towards what Lonergan calls "the Absolute." Further, Lonergan believes that as one's thinking broadens and becomes more comprehensive, it transcends the limitations of individuality (in the restrictive sense) and becomes more objective. One of the main purposes of Lonergan's painstaking analysis of the process of cognition, and of its development through the levels of experience, understanding, and judgement, is to show how objectivity emerges from subjectivity.

There is something very Canadian about Bernard Lonergan's analysis of subjectivity. For one thing, Lonergan's emphasis on religious experience and on the need for the consciousness to come to terms with its religious dimension through an incremental process of self-apprehension gives space and scope to grace, a divine gift which engenders a state which—perhaps because it is such that it cannot be named or described seems well suited to the preternaturally silent Canadian subject—has had a particularly prominent place in Canadian theology.

Further, Lonergan's thinking has a polymathic character: in reading *Insight* one recognizes that author is familiar with: the mathematics of group theory, the key ideas that constitute the core of contemporary physical science, psychoanalysis,theology, phenomenology, religious studies, medieval thought, Kant's philosophy, psychology and historical linguistics. Such a polymathic enterprise seems somehow very Canadian; certainly, others have pointed out on these pages previously, that many prominent Canadian intellectuals have been polymaths—I'd offer as just a sampling of possible examples: H.M.S. Coxeter's work at the boundary of art and mathematics; Hugh Kenner's interest in scientific models and literature; Marshall McLuhan's interest in media, sociology, literary theory, Ezra Pound, popular culture, Catholicism, medieval studies, and Wynham Lewis; and Michael Snow's work as improvising musician, painter, photographer, filmmaker, holographer, sculptor, book designer, recorded-sound artist, and his evident interest in philosophical issues.

Moreover, Lonergan's effort to accommodate to a neo-Thomist framework certain features of modern thought, along with certain theological elements that generally have been associated with the Protestant tradition (for example, the emphasis on personal experience and on apprehending theological truths through other than purely doctrinal means), has parallels in the thought of other Canadian Catholic theologian/philosophers, and even seems to reflect something of the social reality of Canadian life. One certainly acquires a sense of intellectual and fideistic federalism from Lonergan's project.

But it is especially the conviction that objectivity emerges through the acts by which the subject accedes to self-apprehension and self-possession that seems particularly Canadian. When reading *Insight* I often think of artwork of Michael Snow, whose works, though they are deeply concerned with subjectivity, inasmuch as they engage with perceptual and cognitive processes still strike one as being resolutely objective and determinately factual. Indeed such a nearly paradoxical interest—the awareness that what is subjective can have virtually the status of an object, and the awareness of the subjective status of objective perception-- seems characteristic of Canadian artists. In what I have written concerning the interest that Canadian artists have taken in the photograph, and concerning the effects that photography has had on Canadian art, I have tried to show that the photograph has served for many Canadian artists as an analogue for (and, even, a model) for consciousness at the same time as it has struck them with its capacity to convey objective reality (and, paradigmatically, the *operations* of nature); and this curious dual status that mixes subjectivity and objectivity was a key component of what I intended.

But it was the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that provided Lonergan with the model of how objectivity emerges from subjectivity. This, after all, is what is implied in the First Critique's —the famous, the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*—demonstration that objects of experience are formed as the mind imposes the categories on the raw material furnished by intuition. It is also evident in the argument of the Third Critique—the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of Judgement*) —that, though experience grounds our judgement that a certain object is a work of art, the judgements themselves are intersubjective and so, in a sense, objective.

Lonergan's writing displays other Kantian features: the very division of the process of human knowing into the phases of experience (or, in Kantian terms, Intuition), understanding and judgement is Kantian enough; but the outlines of his characterizations of these "levels of experience" (as Lonergan terms them) have Kantian analogues as well: for he proposes that experiencing is a self-structuring process of apprehending data; that through examination of these data and through formulating comparisons among them one accedes to insight; and that we validate the veridical nature of the understanding such insights furnish by considering further evidence.

But of all the influences that Kant's philosophy had on Bernard Lonergan, the most

important of all was Kant's conception of philosophy as transcendental inquiry—inquiry into the necessary conditions of experience—conditions that assure we know certain truths about what any experience will be like even in advance of having that experience. Of course, Lonergan was not alone in adopting Kant's proposal that epistemology's proper method is that of transcendental inquiry: that conception has had an enormous effect on the philosophical world ever since Kant announced it. Kant's example turned the direction of much subsequent philosophy towards inquiry into the "conditions of possible experience." Indeed notions of what constitutes "a condition of possible experience" ramify throughout the history of post-Kantian philosophy. The phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, for example, proposed that method of "transcendental phenomenological reduction" demonstrated that ordinary, unreflective experience had as its condition a pure consciousness or transcendental ego that was not accessible to empirical scrutiny—an ego that, because it experiences both inner and outer objects, must belongs to neither domain but must be transcendental, as Kant's philosophy implied. In Husserl's philosophy and those of his followers, the argument that associationists had studied mental objects as though they were physical and had neglected to ask why experience takes the form that it has (because they had neglected to inquire into the conditions of experience) constituted a powerful argument against psychologism. Even Noam Chomsky's approach, and that of some of his followers among "cognitive scientists," examines certain human activities (e.g., the capacity to acquire and learn language as we do) with a view to understanding what conditions make those phenomena possible; such lines of inquiry have a strong transcendental streak.

Furthermore, Kantian philosophy was the nexus out of which emerged the argument that resonates in Bernard Lonergan's philosophy, to the effect that we may well regard certain classes of ideal phenomena as objective: thus, while David Hume and John Stuart Mill, for example, considered logical and arithmetic truths to be dependent on accidental psychological states, transcendental philosophers argue that these truths are objective, just because they are transcendentally determined. They regard such transcendental determination, finally, as being deeper than the distinction between subject and object.

As with any strong conception that has such wide-ranging and thorough-going effects, Kant's conception of philosophy as transcendental inquiry has engendered both adulation and derogation, and it continues to provoke both positive and negative responses. Among the more vigorously polemical of recent naysayers is Walter Kaufmann, whose *Goethe, Kant and Hegel* (Volume One of his *Discovering the Mind* trilogy) lambasts Kant for proposing false standards of rigour and certainty for philosophical inquiry, and for concealing his own failure to live up to those standards in an abstruse, tangled, impenetrable style of writing; at one point Kaufmann characterizes Kant's writing style as that of "a constipated casuist [Kant took pills for constipation all his adult life, consumption of which he is known to have strictly limited to two per day] who is afraid of letting go of a sentence; he goes on and on, adding clauses, often past the point where they can be construed"—to which characterization he appends the scathing quip about, I believe, the philosophical community at large, "This scandalous style was meant to be, and soon became, the paradigm of serious philosophical writing. Whatever was not written more or less like this was presumed not to be serious philosophy." More tellingly yet, Kaufmann accuses Kant as imposing his own crabbed mind and radically constricted sensibility as the models for mind and experience in general (as though such a use of "in general," in connection with "mind" and "experience," could have referential validity.)

On the other hand, Aaron Sloman's contribution to the Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science, entitled *The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy, Science and Models of Mind* (to take just one revealing example from the not too distant past) offers the view that Kant's conception of philosophy as transcendental inquiry was a giant step forward for

philosophy. That such a defence of Kantianism should have emerged from a study of mind which was based on the model of the computer is not insignificant: Most cognitive science leans more or less steeply towards Kantianism—that explains why writings in cognitive science often seem redolent of Köhler's gestaltist ideas (whose founding ideas were furnished by the neo-Kantism that dominated most German universities in that psychological theory's heyday.) And, only a few years after Sloman's transcendental analysis of cognition appeared, Irene Harvey, speaking from the deconstructionist camp, published *Derrida and the Economy of Différance*, which begins with an introduction significantly entitled, "Derrida's Kantian Affiliation or Prolegomena to the Destruction of Metaphysics and the Recognition of *Différance*" and goes on to expound, *in extenso*, on the Kantian provenance of Derrida's ideas (to which she is clearly sympathetic.) And, appearing at just the same time from the circle of "analytical" philosophers, Orona O'Neill's *Constructions of Reason* offered to rework Kant so as to strengthen the Kantian edifice. More recently still, Christopher Norris, whose commentary on the intersections of philosophy and literary theory has become stronger with each new book, has contended, in *What's Wrong with Postmodernism,* that most of what is wrong in postmodernism is that postmodernist theorists have got their Kant wrong, or haven't been bothered with Kant sufficiently to have had due exposure to his salutary effects.

And, of course, prominent among those who have viewed Kant's philosophical methods favourably is the great Canadian Jesuit philosopher, Bernard Lonergan. Like Kant, Lonergan seeks to understand the process of cognition, in all its phases or "levels," through a transcendental inquiry. He begins by accepting what introspection teaches him; that the data of introspection figure among the *données* of Lonergan's philosophy—as, essentially, its empirical foundation—is a key aspect of Lonergan's philosophy, for it establishs that his system will accord to the intensional objects of apperception no lesser reality than it does to the intensional objects of perception. With this as his starting point, he sets out to analyze experience, and discovers that the most telling of experiences is the experience of insight—or, rather, the multiform experience*s*, of insight (for, there is a manner—on the adequacy of which I shall offer some reflections in due course—in which Lonergan's philosophy understands that experience is polymorphic and that it assumes different characteristics according to its particular level of consciousness and, within each level, according to the comprehensiveness of the insight it affords.) Having identified insight as consciousness' most telling experience (and this identification establishes the basis for Lonergan's philosophical project—I shall later state why I believe it not to be a sound basis), the transcendental inquiry begins: Lonergan asks what structuring activities each level of consciousness must engage in to make it possible for the experience of insight associated with it to have the particular form that he discovers (through introspection) it to have.

Moreover, like Kant, Lonergan's transcendental analysis of cognition is directed partly toward the end of furthering consciousness' effort to raise itself to a higher level of self-possession, and partly toward the end of grounding belief in human freedom and ensuring that morality be afforded its rightful scope in human life. Even Lonergan's schema of the levels of consciousness—experiencing, understanding, judging—is designed so as to show how each higher level marks an increase in freedom and in individual responsibility; and further, in Lonergan's philosophy, as in Kant's, experiencing (intuiting), understanding, and judging are propaedeutic to a final level, that of deciding, which Lonergan describes as "the topmost level of human consciousness." Furthermore, like Kant, Lonergan associates this " topmost level of human consciousness" with religion; and, if any thing, Lonergan goes even farther than Kant in his valuation of this domain, for he treats decision and action as a means of transcendence through which people remake themselves, in their personal being and in their relation to others.

Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge, a recent book by Giovanni

Salas, a German Kant scholar and a former student of Lonergan's at Rome's Gregorian University, examines the relation between Lonergan's cognitional theory and Kant's epistemology. Salas sees Lonergan as, essentially, a post-Kantian philosopher; his importance, on Salas' view, is that Lonergan manages to patch some holes in the Kantian edifice.

Salas' extremely high estimation of Lonergan's work—that it carries out successfully the project that Kant announced but failed to carry through to consistent conclusions—is heart-warming, given the still-not-uncommon neglect of Lonergan's work by professional philosophers (-- probably because of his religious bend and his theological "commitments," which, still today, are often understood as shackling free thought.) There is, to cite recent evidence of that neglect, no entry for Bernard Lonergan in the new *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (when there are, to give examples, for: Tyler Burge and Myles Burnyeat—or, to limit mention to Canadians or erstwhile Canadians, for the expatriate Canadian Paul Churchland; the fine, and too little cited, expatriate Canadian political philosopher, G. A. Cohen; the massively influential expatriate Canadian ethicist David Gautier; and the technically virtuosic expatriate Canadian logician and philosopher of science, Bas van Fraasen.) Nor does Lonergan's name appear in the entry on Canadian philosophy—but then again, neither is the most important study of the history of Canadian philosophy, Amour and Trott's *The Faces of Reason*, cited in the entry's bibliography; and when Lonergan's name does come up in the *Oxford Companion*, it is in an entry on religious philosopy (to wit, neo-Thomism), and even there Lonergan is mentioned only in a very vague sort of way, as offering "a very different sort of transcendental analysis" to that of the exemplary Kantian neo-Thomist, Karl Rahner.

Much of Salas' text is given over to identifying, with great precision, *aporiae* in the Kantian philosophy. Of course I cannot, in a review of this sort, expound just what he says, with all the care that his. But putting his findings in a crude, summary form, the fundamental error Salas discovers in Kant's epistemology is that Kant held two, incompatible beliefs about the faculty through which experience makes contact with the real. Sometimes Kant believes, as he puts it, that "All our knowledge starts with the senses, and proceeds from there to the Understanding" and proposes that the matter which constitutes the experience is furnished entirely by the faculty of Intuition. The Understanding possess only rules (the Categories) for synthesizing this Manifold of Intuitions, of shaping the matter provided by Intuition into conformity with conditions it must meet in order to be experienced. Considering the claims about Intuition that this side of Kant's epistemology expounds, Salas asserts that Kant's model for the an act of Intuition was the experience of looking at something or regarding something (of *Anschauung,* a noun related to verb "*anschauen*," to view.) But, as crucial as this suggestion is, his proposal would have been stronger if he had included commentary on Kant's remarks that at least seem to suggest disanalogies between Kant's conception of Intuition and the act of viewing—disanalogies that led Walter Kaufmann (in *Goethe, Kant, Hegel: The Discovery of Mind*, Volume 1, p. 97) to protest that Kant's appropriation of the term "*Anschauung*" for Intuition implies what is in fact in Kant's epistemological theories a completely spurious analogy between Intuition and the act of viewing.

But, Salas shows, not all of Kant's arguments imply that it is through Intuition alone that experience has contact with the object. There are in the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, passages in which Kant attributes to the Understanding a role in making contact with what is objectively real —a role that implies that the Categories of Understanding have a content which they contribute to experience, and, consequently, that the Categories have their own point of contact with the Object (the reality) they constitute.

These two views on experience's relation to the real are mirrored in Kant's dual views about the origins of the contents of experience. Probably the single most famous passage in the First Critique is Kant's claim: "Without sensibility no Object would be given to us, without

Understanding no Object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; Intuitions without Concepts are blind" (A 51, B 75)/ The statement clearly implies that Intuition provides all the contents of experience (for, without the contents that the faculty of Intuition provides, the Concepts would be empty.) On this view, the Concepts are mere rules of Understanding, a faculty that "*combines and arranges* the material of knowledge, that is, the Intuition." (B 145, italics in original). However, Salas alleges, as famous as this statement is, Kant did not maintain it consistently in the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*. Salas claims (and, to my mind, demonstrates beyond all question), that a good part of the time, Kant speaks of the Concepts (the *a priori* rules of the Understanding) as though they had a role in constituting the very contents of experience—as though, that is, he held that the Understanding fashions the objects we experience by adding something to the contents of experience. (Salas cites, *inter alia*, B 159-60, 163)

Such commentary is not completely original: the idea that Kant held inconsistent ideas about the Imagination, Intuition and the Understanding are common in Kant studies—why, even Norman Kemp Smith's magisterial commentary on the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft* remarks on the inconsistent manner in which Kant handles the idea of the Imagination. What is highly uncommon is the extraordinary care and rigour with which Salas builds the case. Furthermore, Salas carries his observation beyond the domain of commentary on Kant's philosophy, to suggest an alternative epistemological position—but one that is still basically Kantian in outlook, since it is Lonergan's. Salas suggests that Kant was pressured into maintaining antithetical beliefs about the role of the Understanding because of the inadequacy of his primary conception of the Understanding, that the Understanding is simply a faculty for forming unities from the Manifold of Intuitions. Salas asserts that this pressure derives from the erroneousness of Kant's belief that it is possible to lay out a table of Categories which exhaustively described the sorts of unities that might be constituted. The activities of the Understanding are too spontaneous and too various to allow for its being captured by such a formalistic conception.

Salas also suggests that Lonergan took to the heart of his writing Kant's notion that the categories of the understanding are not, in themselves, representations of an object or of its characteristics. Instead, he formulated a more correct understanding of the *a prioi*, as simply operative laws that regulate the action by which the manifold of intuitions is synthesized to ensure that an object (i.e., an entity possessing intellectually apprehensible relations) emerges from this process. Lonergan understood, Salas points out, that we cannot capture the activity of the understanding in a table of categories, with entries whose number is determined *a priori*, and which are fixed for all time. The categories themselves, like every concept (no matter how general), Lonergan understood, are all *a posteriori*. Thus Lonergan states in the introduction to *Insight* (pp. xxi-xxii) that

> Evidence in biology and in phenomenology of religion is established differently; the categories which understanding develops are different; and the methods of verification are not the same. [Cf. Lonergan's analysis of cognition into experience, understanding and judgement.] But in each area there is evidence, categories are developed, and verification occurs.

Salas' book can be considered to be a rich and compelling demonstration of how Lonergan formulated such a belief out of an appreciation of *lacunae* in Kant's philosophy, and of how he recast the notion of the *a priori* through his awareness that what is required of experience (and so what we can know *a priori* to condition experience) is that intelligence has an operative role in forming the object of experience, inasmuch as the object of experience is a construct of intelligible relations and relata. This, Salas contends, is how Lonergan understands

the *a priori*, and in this, he is right, where Kant was wrong.

Thus the starting point for Lonergan's analysis of cognition is what introspection teaches him, and the fundamental thing that introspection teaches him is that the experience of insight has a relational structure as its object. Several of Lonergan's critics have focused on Lonergan's manner of using what he claims are data provided by introspection at crucial points in his analysis of understanding and insight; some even claim that their introspection reveals nothing of the data Lonergan claims are experienced in an act of understanding or insight. Such critics, I suspect, are very close to a truth. I say this not because I am generally doubtful regarding claims issuing from introspection—indeed, I believe that Lonergan's attacks on the folly of that most absurd enterprise in the recent history of our folly-prone academies, that of behaviourist psychology, were in their time a breath of fresh air and plain common-sense.

I believe the real grounds for commentators' criticism of Lonergan's appeal to introspection, even if they have not articulated it, is not a wholesale dismissal of the validity of the data of introspection, but rather the fact that Lonergan considers such data only in structural terms, and does not really consider what it reveals about the experience's developmental aspects. Such a bias towards a structural conception of experience, of course, allies Lonergan with Kant; but it also explains the profoundly phenomenological tone his writing often adopts (—indeed he remarks that his method involves "intentionality analysis that presupposes that data of consciousness"). The phenomenologists' interest in returning to pure experience and their conception of the *epoché* (the suspending of all assumptions about the status of experience) steered phenomenology towards such a radical empiricism that all that which lay outside the domain of immediacy was deemed not to belong to the founding data of basic science.

One might be reminded, when thinking about this phenomenological dimension of Lonergan's writing, that Derrida's critique of the concept of presence was directed against the whole of Western metaphysical tradition, certainly, but first and foremost against Husserl's philosophy. Derrida's philosophical writings are far from being a model of clarity (but then again, *clarté* is one of the ideals that has mislead philosophers, he would aver); but one point on which they are splendidly clear is that the philosopher's valuation of reason has been formulated in a futile, and ultimately self-defeating, attempt to contain an "irrational" (i.e., non-logomorphic) aspect of experience that nonetheless strives to make itself felt continually. What this pressure is that disturbs the order of language, Derrida has avoided saying—mostly because he seems to think that language has most of the functions that Kant attributes to experience, while what constitutes this pressure belongs to an unknowable, impossible-to-apprehend domain, the domain of the negative. Hence, it would no more make sense for Derrida to speak of this domain than it would for Kant to speak of the noumena that affect the senses and thereby provide the material upon which the Categories operate (though, of course, both Derrida and Kant have remarkably much to say about what is supposed to be unknowable). It is for just this reason that portions of Derrida's writing have even assumed the character of a negative theology after the fashion of the Pseudo-Areopagite's, proclaiming that the domains of language and thought coincide precisely (as language gives to what we experience its form and, consequently, applies only to what it furnishes to our experience); but what lies beyond, though impossible to apprehend, nonetheless exerts a power over our being and our desires.

A tendency to sacralize this powerful, yet indefinite, element implicit in all experience but inapprehensible by any of its modalities has asserted itself forcefully and insistently since, at least, the time of the Romantics. So it is that one might also well be reminded, in thinking of this lacuna in Lonergan's writing, of the few pages that give words to Goethe's argument with Kant and, specifically, to his criticism of scientific attitude that Kant extolled in *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*; indeed, I find those few pages vastly more suggestive of this "elsewhere" within experience than all Derrida's have been.

Goethe recognized that Kant's philosophical project was driven partly by the desire to defend Isaac Newton's science, which served him as a model for the human understanding of nature, from the wrecking-ball that David Hume had directed at it (and in particular at the idea of causality as involving an "occult force.") Kant wished to show, as Goethe well knew, that mathematics truly afforded understanding of the relations that obtain in nature, and so that the science of nature should be as mathematical as it is in Newton's *Principia*—and, yet, to do so without committing himself to any anti-moral, anti-religious determinism that denied any place to human freedom. Accordingly, throughout his life, Kant maintained that one can discern in any theory of nature only so much of real science as we can find real mathematics in it. Any theory of determinate objects, he averred, is possible only through mathematics.

Goethe's theory of nature is just the opposite. His *Zur Farbenlehre* (*Towards a Doctrine of Colours*) was, famously, an extended attack on Newton and Newtonian physics. But *Zur Farbenlehre* is not the only place Goethe attacked the mathematical conception of nature. Goethe's writings on science constitute a single, extended protest against that conception, and argue for the divorce of physics from mathematics; and so they are directed against the Kantian conviction that mathematics should form the warp-and-woof of any theory of nature. Goethe proposed that physics and mathematics should disengage each other: "It [physics] must be completely independent, and try to penetrate with all its loving, reverent, pious force into nature and its holy life, quite regardless of what mathematics accomplishes and does. Mathematics, for its part, must declare itself independent of everything external, go its own distinctive and important way, and cultivate a greater purity than is possible when as heretofore it concerns itself with existence and endeavours to win something from it or to conform to it."

The comment can seem to be (as so much of Goethe's *Maxims and Reflections* can seem in translation) a mere platitude. But to dispel that suspicion, one need only consider the direction in which J. Bolyai, N. Lobachevski and G.F.B. Riemann took mathematics, with their development of non-Euclidean geometries which reject the famous fifth axiom of Euclid's geometry (that given any straight line and a point outside the line one, and only one, line can be drawn through the point parallel to the line) and either postulate, as the first two of the aforementioned geometers did, that there can be more than one line parallel to the given line can be drawn through the point, or else formulate, as Riemann did, a geometry in which all lines meets and so in which there are no parallels, and from Euclid's first four axioms and this postulation as the fifth, generate a consistent set of geometric conclusions far different from those of the Euclidean geometry Kant took to be universally valid. By such means one declares mathematics "independence from everything external"—that mathematics no longer concerns itself with, or to conforms to, existence. Or, again to dispell the suspicion that Goethe's counsel amounts to nothing more than an hollow platitude, one can consider how, following in the wake of these geometers, Gottlob Frege (in *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl*, 1884 and *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, vol 1 1893, vol. 2 1903), David Hilbert (in, especially, *Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik* of 1905), Bertrand Russell (in *The Principles of Mathematics*, 1903) and A.N. Whitehead (who collaborated with Russell on the three volumes of *Principia Mathematics* that appeared between 1910 and 1913) would cultivate a mathematics of a much "greater purity."

But if Goethe's remarks seems prescient on these matters, this was not the strongest insight they convey. Goethe's proclamation that physics must "try to penetrate with all its loving, reverent and pious force into nature and its holy life" embeds an insight into the relation between consciousness and nature that is just as profound—and just as staunchly anti-Kantian. But what Goethe understood as necessary for physics he understood was necessary for art as well; on this matter, too, he also differed from Kant, for Kant maintained that science demands no leap of intuition. In the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Kant suggests that the means for making

scientific discovery can be taught and so, in the sciences, the greatest discoverer is separated from laboring drudge only in degree and not in sort. However, he claimed, the same is not true of the arts: the artist must have genius, and this natural endowment alone provides him/her with the means to ascribe rules to art. After his brief involvement in the *Sturm und Drang* movement and the publication of *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (*The Sorrows of Young Werther*), Goethe came to agree with Kant that genius does not do without rules. However Goethe differed with Kant on the source of those rules, and Goethe's conclusions on that issue reverberated through the entire Romantic era. One can highlight the difference between them by saying that while Kant described genius as an endowment though which the subject gives rules to art, Goethe agreed with Lessing on the matter of genius, and Lessing described genius as "an innate disposition through which *nature* gives rules to art [emphasis mine]." For Goethe, as for Lessing, nature was the source of all genuine rules for the making of art.

Accordingly, while Kant disconnects nature from art and truth from beauty, making each incommensurate with the other, for Goethe no such disconnection is viable—in his thought the fields of nature and art, science and art, truth and beauty remain united. Accordingly Goethe, on his *italienische Reise*, extols the art of ancients for being "true to the laws of nature." Such claims imply a potent criticism of the Kantian view of experience as deriving its form from the subject, and of the subject itself as the possessing forms that, were it not for the content provided by the Manifold of Intuitions, would remain empty, formal rules.

Goethe is pleasantly self-mocking about his talent for philosophy— his own description of his philosophical efforts make them sound like those of so many creative people. So, as Ernst Cassirer notes in his charming essay, "Goethe and the Kantian Philosophy," Goethe reveals that when he would occasionally become embroiled in discussions of, and propounded of his own understanding of points in, Kant's philosophy, the Kantians among his interlocutors would simply shake their heads and moan that what he had just presented perhaps had some resemblance to some Kantian view or another, but was nothing more than strange "analogue of the Kantian position." Yet his understanding of Kant's philosophy was arrived at by an assiduous reading of, amongst others of Kantian works, the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft* (to the assiduousness of which his heavily annotated copy testifies.)

Such charming modesty aside, I believe that Goethe understood much better than he allowed. When, in the introduction to *Zur Farbenlehre,* Goethe speculates that "Merely looking at a thing can tell us nothing. Each look leads to an inspection, each inspection to a reflection, each reflection to a synthesis; and hence we can say that in every attentive glace at the world we are already theorizing." At issue here is a conception of human understanding that understands what Kant's practice denied: that intuition and understanding, that sight and theory are a unity that cannot be divided.

Against Kant, then, Goethe believed nature to be the source of all genuine artistic principles; what is more, he attributes to nature the same productive role in the formulation of understanding. Yes, seeing involves theory, but that is also because the principles of understanding involved have their source in nature itself. Thus, while Kant's rules (Categories) of the Understanding belong entirely to the subject, and the subject imposes on them on the content furnished by experience, Goethe's belong to nature. While Kant isolates the self from nature, Goethe shows how the self and nature, subject and object, constitute a unity. When Kant described the mind as the "law-giver to nature," Goethe disagreed, in the most profound way imaginable, by assuring us of nature's autonomy and of nature's regulation over humankind.

Consider Lonergan's views on cognition in relation to Goethe's. Goethe's saying that "each look leads to an inspection, each inspection to a reflection, each reflection to a synthesis" might sound very like Lonergan's claim that experience develops into understanding, and that

acts of understanding develop into judgements. In fact, the two claims are realms removed from one another. What Goethe asserts here is his fundamental conviction that all esperience is a unity, the belief that primal experience transmutes itself organically from form to form (in much the fashion that his morphological research in botany revealed), and hence that later developments are already contained in the earlier. Lonergan, on the contrary, conceives experience's development pattern as being much less organic than Goethe did, for he sets out that pattern as interlocuting hierarchies of abstractions.

All this ties back quite directly to Salas' very fine, very meticulous work on Lonergan. Salas shows that Kant offers inconsistent views on the origin of the contents of experience and that Lonergan reworks the Kantian problematic from the ground up in such a way as to overcome this inconsistency. Lonergan does this, Salas explains, by radicalizing Kant's insight that the Understanding is really a faculty that operates upon the matter of experiences in order to constitute the objects of experience as nexūs of intelligible relations. But even for all his care, one still has reason to question the adequacy of Lonergan's solution to the problem of intuition that Salas claims is such an important drive in Lonergan's works. For Lonergan's notion of an empirical residue—of data, relating primarily to unique features of particular experiences to which Lonergan denies inherent intelligibility, and which distinguish one member of a class from other members of the same class—seems to me to be a notion constructed to paper over the difficulties that arise from the disconnection of insight from the concrete realities of experience. It seems to me what makes it necessary for Lonergan to formulate the notion of empirical residue is that he does not regard the cognitive process as one whose levels are really morphological transformations (to make use of that Goethean coinage) of one another—phases in which some features of the earlier phase are enhanced, and some attenuated, but none tossed away, into the realm of that which lacks inherent intelligibility. The need for the notion of an empirical residue indicates that Lonergan sees the progress of cognition, rather, as an essentially abstractive process, that discards aspects of lower levels of experience (by consigning then to the realm of that which lacks inherent intelligibility) as it ascends towards what finally is an ideal form.

Lonergan's notion of the conjugate—general qualities or general forms, required of inquiry by the canon of parsimony so as to apply to a range of events, that have an inherent intelligibility and so stand in the same relation to events as questions of intelligence stand to questions of reflection —and especially his notion of the pure conjugate (of intelligible qualities that are not directly intelligible, but are taken for real in some theoretical enterprise because they make for an economical understanding an apprehensible set of relations which actually can be observed) seems to me to point towards a similar problem. The idea that an object is an intelligible unity that we apprehend in an act of insight which may well transcend experience and imagination suggests to me that very disconnection of the intelligible from concrete experience that has been the ruling paradigm of modernity.

Salas' Lonerganian proclivities are evidenced in another truncation. Though, admittedly, Salas did not intend his to be a speculative book, one still might wish that *Lonergan and Kant* had considered the larger cultural implications of Kant's assertion that the actions of the Understanding are guided by a set of rules that legislate to experience. Kant's formulation of the idea that the forms of the Understanding derive not from the objects of experience but from the Understanding itself gives expression of that tendency towards the localization of "value" which is such an important theme in Charles Taylor's magisterial *Sources of the Self*. The origins in the modern paradigm of the notion that the subject is the ground of truth might have been an especially interesting line for Salas to pursue, inasmuch as this Kantian tendency is reflected in Lonergan's proclamation that religious experience, and not creedal propositions, are the grounds of faith.

Thinkers as diverse as George Grant, Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre have looked very penetratingly at the modern's tendency to "localize" value, and all of them have concluded that the present age's emphasis on the subject and its conviction that the natural world contains no values have roles in modernity's ruling paradigm. Grant and MacIntyre protest the evacuation of value from the realm of nature (and were probably motivated to do so by the fundaments of their faith); Taylor, on the other hand, does not (admittedly because he avows no need to.) Though one must acknowledge Salas' book is of a more analytic sort—of a sort that cautiously shuns speculation about cultural forms—it would be nice to know what Salas' beliefs about whether Lonergan's cognitional theory reflects modern conceptions about the place and role of subjectivity and, if they do, whether his theories on subjectivity are confined by modernity's limiting beliefs about the range of experiential modalities; these questions are made all the more pressing by the extent to which Lonergan's concerns are driven by concerns with methods and results of experimental science somewhat similar to the early Protestant modernist theologian, Albrecht Ritschl.

Modernity has consolidated itself by restricting awareness to a single mode, and excluding (by decreeing as invalid, unsupportable, non-veridical, etc.) all other forms of experience. Kant's philosophy is a paradigmatic expression of that impulse of modernity: the aspiration to formulate religious beliefs that do not trespass over the limits of reason alone, the anti-teleological thrust of Kant's repudiation of Christian Wolff's philosophy (given that teleology was the last remnant of the classical world view that maintained that value was objectively given), his emphasis on autonomy, and his urge to make the test of moral goodness a form of logical consistency and to portray evil as that which forces into inner inconsistency, all indicate Kant's privileging of modernity's paradigmatic experiential mode.

But there is, I insist, a mode of experience that cannot be enclosed within modernity's canon of experiential validity, that of narrative coherence, for its temporal basis is completely at odds with that of narrative. This form of awareness apprehends each new moment as an ecstatic moment standing forth in the luminous moment of presence, and the temporal process itself as "a continual coming-on" on novelty. But that primordial form of awareness knows no distinction between subject and objects, for it experiences all that is in an immediate upsurge of disclosure in which giving-to-be and giving-to-awareness are indistinguishable. In fact, it is a mode of experience that knows no categorical distinctions between intellectual and the sensory, the abstract and the concrete, the mental and the corporeal, the human and the natural—those pairs of opposites that Derrida has shown so cogently structure Western metaphysics. It is a mode of knowledge inaugurated before the individual acquires language, and necessarily so, for these oppositions structure language and its concomitant form, narrative, which in its turn serves to give the self the form it has in the regime of modernity. This is the experience of "being" of which the poet Hölderlin wrote, an intuition of divine life that the poet experiences—and a form of awareness that (as that Canadian authority on the development of Hegel's thought, H.S. Harris, shows) shook Hegel out the Kantian convictions of his Tübingen phase. But, because this mode of experience is non-relational I cannot imagine that Lonergan's cognitional theory would have anything of value to say about it.

Of course, not all experience poses so radical a challenge, and there are those who would exclude this mode of experience from consideration as cognition on the grounds of its unreliability. But I would suggest that there is is a hierarchy of experiences from experiences that are primarily affective (of which the form of experience I have just alluded to is the extreme) to those that are more "intellectual" or abstract, and that even those that are most purely affective have value as cognition: our moods, for example, disclose how we are with the world and how the world is with us; while our affective object-choices reveal profound aspects of their intentional object, but do so in ways that the intellect cannot discern. Cognition, I believe, comes

in many different types, the various types of cognition have neither a common object (for example Lonergan's Absolute) nor a common structure; and, I believe, the worlds formed by different cognitive acts are incommensurate with one another. It is the insistence that this is not so, and that there is only one form of veridical cognition (or the version of it that appears in Lonergan's philosophy, which asserts that all forms of cognition have characteristics in common with an exemplary mode of cognition), that marks the modern paradigm, and is that insistence that makes aesthetic experience seem such a preposterous topic to moderns.

Even though Lonergan's model of cognition allows that affects may play an important role in cognition and even seems to suggest, at times, that different experiential modes and different forms of cognition have significantly different intentional objects, his analysis suggests an intellectual quality to cognition than I believed to be unwarranted for some its forms, including some its most common forms. Lonergan's cognitional theory takes a much too intellectual model of cognition as its measure of veridical experience. To consider how profoundly an intellecutal conception of cognition biases his analysis of cognition, consider experience of love. Love certainly attunes us to its intentional object and it reveal profound qualities of those whom we love—for example, their charity and their need to be cared for—but does it really produce resembling what Lonergan describes as insight? Thus Lonergan treats the affects, really, as though they add depth to cognition (without which they would lack a dimension of human significance) but he does not really think of the affects as a form of cognition whose methods are profoundly different from those involved in achieving what he calls "insight," nor does he broach any suggestion that what is known through the affects is incommensurate with what is known through intellectual activity.

Because his cognitional theory is not tied to a fixed table of categories and because, by suggesting that there are no *a priori* "categories of understanding" and, rather, that all categories of understanding develop in response to experience Lonergan affords more scope to the developmental aspects of cognition. Whether that scope is adequate is a large question, which obviously, I cannot undertake to answer here. But I tend to think not, and on much the same grounds as those on which Romantics challenged Kant—that a really adequate conception of mind ends up identifying it with nature. This is the significance of primordial experience of the sort I alluded to above, and this, finally, is what makes Hegel's thought of such enormous importance. Lonergan went a way towards this when, in *Method in Theology*, he revised the Kantian treatment of the good he had offered in *Insight,* (as belonging to the realm of the good and the intelligible), so that the good was presented more as a proper notion, distinct from intelligibility and not determined exclusively by considerations of reasonableness. I wish he had gone farther in this direction. And, while its great care makes *Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge* essential reading for anyone interested in issues around subjectivity (and while I certainly acknowledge that it is far and away the richest study of Lonergan I have yet read), I do feel just a bit saddened by the fact Salas' conception of experience remains so firmly tied to that first mapped out by the great Immanuel Kant and, more exactly, to the version of Kantianism developed by one Kant's most rigorous followers and incisive critics, still, I have to acknowledge that the rigour and incisiveness of *Insight* has found fitting *hommage* in Salas' fine care.