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Dear Prof. Nanni

Thank you for the opportunity to read your very interesting article, "Contra Dogmaticos." It offers a trenchant critique of various versions of phenomenological essentialism in aesthetics and, more specifically, of the claim that polysemicity is the cardinal feature that distinguishes poetic language from ordinary language. Such a critique is much needed as phenomenological essentialism has been, as you well know, one of the dominant positions in twentieth-century aesthetics. You have argued with admirable rigour and elegance for dispensing with definitions of art that involve any sort of essentialism and for believing that the standards for distinguishing art objects from all other objects are formed through social agreements. Your argument that decisions regarding the aesthetic status of an object are decided by invoking an implicit standard (or, as you more often say, statute) has considerable explanatory power, for it avoids on the one hand the problems associated with any form of aesthetic essentialism (problems on which you comment insightfully) and, on the other hand, the problems of complete relativism (for you make evident that we do petition to a standard when making such decisions and that we examine the object to determine whether it actually possesses the features that the standard demands).

On the more specific topic of your article, I find your critique of the essentialist claims for polysemy very astute and, again, very much needed. And I relished your demonstration of the historicity of use of the standard of polysemicity to identify and assess artworks..

Nonetheless, there are features of the article that I should want to query. The first has to do with the role that you accord the collective subject. You construct this role, it seems to me, in such a way as to legitimate your claim that artistic specificity is constituted "in the spaces where the identity of all things is constituted—and starting from cultural causes, obviously, not from natural ones."

But this way of proceeding in aesthetics, from collective to individual, from the constitutive social forces to the subjectivity those forces constitute, inevitably runs up against a problem: the irreducibility of experience. By referring "the irreducibility of experience," I do not mean to imply that spiritual/idealist metaphysics are required to explain experience, nor that subjectivity cannot possibly be an effect of the processes by which individuals work themselves into social structures that they do not consciously determine, but to which they subject themselves. Rather, I mean to claim that no account of the actual texture of experience, what the experience actually feels like, can be given in other than subjective terms, as the descriptors that apply to the contents of the subjective realm are incommensurate with descriptors that apply to the material objects or to social forms. For this reason, we cannot formulate a statement of what an experience feels like in non-experiential terms (in terms that do not depend the concept of experience). Or, to put it simply, cannot translate subjective statements into objective statements without losing something.

There is nothing inevitably spiritual about the sort of account I have in mind—though, of course, explanations involving spiritual/ideal elements can serve the ends to which I am pointing. It is conceivable that a materialist account could someday do the work required of it, of explaining why it is that our encounter with works of art possesses appreciably different

characteristics than our encounter with other sorts of objects. It might be that someday we will be able to make a centerpiece of aesthetic theory the principle that social forces operate on the body in conjunction with objective stimuli to produce experience and to use that principle as a basis for considering a work of art as a machine that mobilizes patterned stimuli and, at the same, organizes social forces (most of which would likely have taken the form of memories), to the end of generating specifiable effects.

Just to show how far I am willing to go in the direction of materialism, I want to point out that I am very far from sceptical of such a possibility. I have too long been a student of Eizenstein to not feel thrilled by the prospect. Far from being sceptical, I conjecture that materialist considerations of exactly this sort might expose efforts to explain consciousness as the effects of social processes of subjectification as being incomplete, for they might reveal there exists a biological core to experience and, what is more, a biological residue within experience that is never completely subjected to processes that inaugurate subjectivity—that even while society operates upon the body, and through its regulation shapes conscious experience and imposes upon it those features that create the sense of enduring subjective identity, a residue of biological energies unregulated by the statutes of subjectivity enter experiences, and I have become very interested by this shadow within every formed thought. This shadow, I believe, constitutes a nucleus of experience that is prior to sociality, a core around which experience forms, a shadow within experience and which effects all the experience that forms around it, but of which we never become conscious because language has no way to accommodate it—I am even inclined to speak of this core as a structuring absence around which experience forms, as the originary non-existent that is eclipsed in our awareness of existents. Much of my own work, it might point out (again to insist on how far I am willing to go in the direction of materialism) has attempted to follow up on this suspicion. This is what has led me to make the embodied experience central to aesthetic theory, and to consider that relation between artistic forms and those preverbal, nearly somatic, experiences that cannot be accommodated by ordinary language—that defy its statutes and contravene its norms. Study of many individual artworks, ferreting for evidence they give of the operation of a different, and more corporeal form of awareness, and consideration of the range of theorists from Kristeva to Stoller, and from Frye to Freud, from Artaud to the verbal productions of paranoiacs has made me increasingly convinced that the purpose of artworks is to reanimate such experiences.

Nonetheless, to explain my initial question to you does not demand that one adopt such an extreme position. It suffices to realize that experience, though perhaps conditioned by social factors, cannot be reduced to those factors. Analysis of the phenomenon of consciousness—and (not the same) subjectivity—demands a different set of descriptors than the analysis of social forces. And, I would argue, the importance of art depends strictly on the difference between the way we experience objects in their quotidian mode of appearance and the way we experience them when we apprehend them aesthetically. One reason (among many) that I so admire Kant and have found his aesthetics so useful is that it provides an exact description of the constitutive features of aesthetics experience—that it is experience of *Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*, purposiveness without a purpose (inasmuch as it involves enjoying the recognition that the parts of objects are mutually adapted to one another and to the whole, even while this adaptation serves no other end than inducing our enjoyment of it).

I do not argue that social factors play no role in constituting such experience. Nor do I claim that institutional factors have no part to play. All I claim is that a full account of the lived experience of an object is required if we are to understand its status as a work of art, and that such an account cannot be reformulated without remainder in non-subjective terms. We can consider all this by way of analogy to religion. We might (as some do) consider the importance of religion as an experiential matter and that the experience of prayer, say, might be considered as cardinal to understanding that social institution we call religion.

If we consider religion this way, our account of religious experience (of, let us say, the experience of prayer) need not be phenomenological (*strictu sensu*), since nothing about our method compels us to ignore questions regarding the social constitution of the subject who

prays. Nor are we required to invoke suggestions that prayer returns our being to that of the naked subject who, in the essential truth of his aloneness, confronts God. We are not compelled to deny that the segregation of a domain that we call sacred is altogether a social phenomenon, nor need we, in order to preserve our premises, avoid identifying those social forces that bring about such a segregation. No, none of this is required; all we need to claim is that what makes the institution of religion important is the difference between religious (sacred) experience and ordinary experience. But we must understand, and be able to provide an account, of the actual qualities of the experience of prayer if we are to fathom the importance that religion has for the individual person (regardless of whether or not that subject is constituted through social practices).

The difference between us concerning the importance to aesthetics of formulating a full account of our experience of art is reflected in the different ways we would explain the importance of Duchamp's art. Your explanation of Duchamp's significance does what some other explanations have done (though your demonstration of the claim is the most elegant I have read), to utilize a version of an institutional theory of art. This involves your arguing that appreciating Duchamp's objects as artworks (that is, according to current statutes, as polysemic) has nothing to do with their structure but rather with the circuit which they enter (p. 27).

My explanation of Duchamp's significance argues that Duchamp's art offers a challenge to, but not a wholesale repudiation of, the modernist ideals that had already become prominent at the time he began making, and thinking about, art. Duchamp brought into particular question the modernist idea of transformation. Modernists argued that every element that becomes a part of a work of art is almost wholly transformed as it is incorporated into the nexus of relations that constitutes that work. The creative power of an artist was gauged, in large measure, by his or her capacity to wrest material elements from their conventional horizon of response, to strip them of all their conventional meanings and conventional associations, and to remake significance anew by fashioning a new horizon of response for them.

A great task of modernist aesthetics was to identify the armature that transforms an element from a conventional signifier with a common meaning (i.e., a meaning that instantiated in other instances in which the element is used) into a original signifier, i.e, a signifier with a meaning unique to this instance— a uniqueness that explains why several commentators, yourself and myself included, have remarked on the unusually intimate relation between *langue* and *parole* in artworks and argued that in appreciating works of art, we are required to infer a new *langue* for every individual work and that we construct the codes of this unique *langue* from the evidence the work provides of its *parole*. (This willingness to discern its *langue* is what one refers to when one speaks of someone's being "open to" a work of art.) The modernist theorists spent great effort, then, on identifying some device, or trope, or form of construction, that can, for example (just to speak of art that involves language) strip a lexeme of ordinary language of its conventional meaning and endow it with new meanings that cannot in any way be identified with their conventional, ordinary language meaning.

Generally two sorts of armatures were identified. The first armature identified was that of formalists: according to the formalists, it is the nexus of internal that subsumes the element that transforms its sense. Thus, if a particular passage in a poem has an especially strongly marked percussive sound, the meanings of the words in that passage will be refashioned by that aural quality and the meanings that are so fashioned for them will be shaped by those aural feature of the passage. Given a sufficiently strong aural construction, the sound sense provided the element by the percussive ambience of which it has become a part will prevail over its ordinary language meaning. The second armature identified was that of the New Critics; they argued that poetic constructions involve features that through the use of paradox, or irony or indeterminacy, destabilize ordinary language meanings. Carried sufficiently far, these forms of construction can void a lexeme of its conventional meanings. New meanings are then provided for it by the nexus of relations of which it becomes a constituent part.

Duchamp's art made such conceptions of the wholesale transformation of artworks'

constitutive elements central to his ideas about art and artmaking. But he never suggested that our response to some material is not changed when it is incorporated into a work of art. Rather, his critique claims that complete transformation is not required. He shows that very slight changes in the way the material is presented can engender enormous changes in our response. As against your claims regarding Duchamp, I believe that Duchamp's genius is his remarkable insight (inventiveness) into the structure of the objects he selected to bring to our attention, so as to make us see them in new ways, and into the ways that material can be presented so as to effect significant changes in our response. At its most radical, Duchamp's manner of presenting his material can amount to a demonstration of the way the focused attention can modify our experience, transforming it into an aesthetic experience. Simply by taking a urinal from our common location and displaying it in an unexpected context—and, not just this, note, but by also turning orthogonally from its usual position—allows us to appreciate it in new way (to consider the shape of the surfaces it displays and their biological relatives, the relation of the several small holes in one place to the larger hole in another, etc.). But notice that there is nothing incompatible with the Kantian analysis; but the Kantian analysis, by connecting our response to artworks to certain features of Reason which Kant considers to be ahistorical, is incompatible with the historicizing tendencies of your commentary.

Duchamp's Kantianism notwithstanding, however, I do not claim that social factors have no role here: one simply must assent to the proposition that social factors shape our expectations. Nor do I claim that our experience of the object itself, as autonomous and devoid of any relation with circumambient factors (social, material or ideal) is the exclusive warrant of that object's status as a work of art. To the contrary, it seems to me evident that one must come equipped with a certain framework of ideas (call it a poetics) if one is to respond to Duchamp's *The Bottle Dryer* in the way that I have suggested.

Rather, my point is simply that our experience of any of the items in Duchamp's oeuvre is, like all experience, an irreducible phenomenon, at least so far as present understandings of experiences allow; we cannot formulate a full account of this experience simply by identifying the social conditions that condition these experiences (whether in whole or in part) or the social processes within which that experience plays a part. What is more, what makes us admit the items in Duchamp's oeuvre really are works of art is our discovery that they have the capacity to engender a special sort of experience that we previously we have experienced only when engaged in intercourse with works of art.

Engendering this unique form of experience is the very end of art. This alone makes an adequate account of this form of experience requisite to any aesthetic theory—since the identity of any social practice is bound up with the ends that serves, and since the end of artworks (what artworks are fitted for by their nature) is to engender experience of a unique sort, we must have a full account of this type of experience to be able to adequately identify the characteristics of that social practice we call art. However, I am very doubtful that one can develop a full account of the experience which artworks, and artworks alone, engender by starting out as you do with a collective subject (just as I doubt whether one can give any but an institution account of the significance of Duchamp's oeuvre if one starts from the collective subject).

You might want to argue that your account can accommodate all the demands of giving an adequate account of the way we experience Duchamp's work—of our subjective response to it. You might attempt to do so by drawing an analogy to your example using the Chairman of the Bank of Italy. You might draw attention to different features of what we would experience if we handled the spurious banknotes as compared to what we experience when we handle actual banknotes. You might say (and of course here I am only conjecturing—I hope you don't consider that I wish to put words in your mouth) that our experience of a piece of paper that is actually (by the statutes that authorize the production, circulation and use of bank notes in Italy) a 100,000 lira note is quite different from our experience of a piece of paper of exactly the type used by the Bank of Italy and printed with the very machine that the Italian mint uses to print bank notes for the Bank of Italy, but which is not (by the statutes that authorize the production and circulation of Italian bank notes) a real 100,000 lira note, provided, of course,

that one recognizes the difference between the status of the first piece of paper and that of the second. (I realize this not what you had in mind). You might want to claim that difference in social status of the two pieces of papers has a role in constituting our subjective responses to each. And you might want to assert that, although when we do know nothing about the different circumstances in which the two pieces of paper were created (this is more the case you had in mind, I believe), the experience of each would be indistinguishable from the experience of the other, still there would a potential for having different a experience of each—that once the different conditions under which each was produced were known, our experience of each would diverge to become distinguishable. And, you might say, this difference in potential experience makes our interaction with the two pieces of paper analogous to the difference in our initial interaction with our two objects (the genuine work of art and the imposter)—that just as our experience of each two pieces of paper is qualitatively indistinguishable from the other so long as we are ignorant of the different conditions of under which each was produced, so our experiences of the genuine art object and of the imposter are identical (in salient respects) so long as we are unfamiliar with the different status of each resulting from the one's complying with the statute that warrants an object as a work of art and the other's not; you might also want to point out that just as with the two pieces of paper there exists a potential for having a different experience of each that would be realized when we know about the different conditions under which each was produced, so with the genuine work of art and the imposter, there exists a potential for having a different experience of each that would be realized when we recognize their different relations to the statutes which warrant a work of art.

My response to such claims would not be to dispute that our experience of the piece of paper we would identify (perhaps) as a piece of counterfeit would be different from that our experience of the genuine banknote, once the difference between the two were known. Rather, I would point out that the difference between our experience of a genuine banknote and our experience of an counterfeit banknote does not provide an analogy with the difference between the lived encounter with a genuine work of art and the experience of a non-aesthetic object—and this is so simply because it is not the purpose of banknotes to generate experiences of themselves as objects while this is the purpose of works of art. The question of whether or not subjective experience is socially constituted by forces and institutions and norms that we have unconsciously assimilated makes no difference in the matter of this disanalogy. The mere fact that experience plays different roles in the two domains—that in the one domain it is not an end-in-itself while in the other it is—suffices to establish the disanalogy.

The disanalogy becomes clearer when consider that one must know something of the different conditions under which each of the two pieces of paper was produced if one is to recognize the different status each has, while one does not have to know anything about the conditions of their production to recognize the difference between the genuine work of art and the imposter. I suspect that you will disagree with this last claim, for I do recognize that you have also tried to analogize poetics with the certain features of conditions of production and have suggested that just as features of the conditions under which banknotes are produced—they are authorized by certain legislation governing the Bank of Italy, the number of bills to be produced is authorized and the number actually produced is recorded, the serial numbers must be unique and sequential, without gaps, etc., etc.—guarantee their authenticity, so too the consensus embodied in the prevailing poetics authorizes that certain textual products will be legitimated as genuine works of art. While I see that one might frame such an argument, I do not accept its claims. My reason for refusing them is that I believe there is a disanalogy in regard to how we come to recognize the difference between two the pieces of paper and how we come to recognize the difference between the two objects (the genuine work of art and the imposter).

The difference is not exactly that in the case of the pieces of paper we must have knowledge of matters that our acquaintance with the pieces cannot furnish us, while in the case of the two objects, the knowledge required to distinguish between them comes exclusively from objects themselves. I would not argue this way because I agree with you that we cannot understand what makes some object a genuine work of art without knowing something about

which of its features are relevant to our judging it to be a work of art; further, I would accept any suggestion to the effect that poetics has an ostensive role and highlights certain features of an object to draw them to our attention. Still, though this is not one of them, I insist that there are important differences between, first, how we come to recognize that one banknote is genuine and the other counterfeit and, second, how we come to recognize that one object is a genuine work of art and the other an imposter. One mark of this difference is that, in order to distinguish between the two pieces of paper, we do not have to take into account any of their intrinsic features, but only their differing relations to the statutes that warrant banknotes; on the other hand, we do have to take into account intrinsic features of the genuine artwork (its signifiers are polysemic) and the imposter (it lacks polysemic signifiers). A second mark of this difference is that we must acquire specialized knowledge (knowledge that applies singularly to this situation) of the conditions under which the two pieces of paper were produced if we recognize the differences between them, while we do not need to have any specialized knowledge to recognize the difference between the genuine work of art and the imposter—for a general knowledge of poetics will suffice. This is what makes it in principle possible for someone to walk into a room containing the two objects and, without making any inquiries (besides those involved in interacting with objects themselves), to identify one of the objects as work of art and the other as an imposter. However, it is in principle impossible to discriminate between the genuine banknote and the imposter in the same way; a person would have to engage in inquiries that we would not expect him/her to have made before arriving. And the third, and for me the most telling, disanalogy concerns the role of our experience in the two cases. If we are not seized by some object and moved by it to aesthetic emotion, we remain in some doubt that the object is a genuine work of art. Of course, we might be willing to acknowledge that it is far more likely that it is a work of art than that it is not, on the basis that we recognize it possesses certain objective features (perhaps because some of its signifiers are polysemic), or on the basis that people whom we admire are willing to testify to its status and to declare that they were moved to aesthetic emotion by it, or on some other basis. Regardless of this willingness, we still harbour some small doubt about its status if we ourselves experienced no aesthetic emotion when interacting with it. Only experience can furnish a sure and certain warrant that the object is a genuine work of art, for engendering aesthetic emotion is the actual purpose of a work of art. Experience plays no such role in warranting a banknote, since banknotes have not the purpose of engendering any kind of emotion (rather, their purpose is to facilitate the exchange of goods and services).

In sum, I believe that the attempt at analogizing the warrant for artworks and the warrant for banknotes fails because of the different role of that experience in the domains of the two practices. And I do not believe that introducing the Peircean theory of abduction can help one to circumvent this criticism.

A few little quibbles over tiny details:

1) On page 20 you suggest that Chomsky's famous sentence (and, though I realize that Chomsky annoys many people, doesn't Chomsky deserve a citation?) is "referentially obscure." But I don't believe that its reference is at all oblique—it is to a null set (performing an action which, to be sure, must also belong to an empty collection). For there can be no "colourless green" entities, any more than there can square circles, for the very reason that the conception of such an entity involves a contradiction. (Nor, for the same reason, can any being sleep furiously, any more than one can shout quietly. And, further, the relation of the verb phrase to the noun phrase involves a category error, as it attributes a behaviour to an entity whose constitution precludes it from engaging in that sort of behaviour.) To change the semiotic model slightly, to Frege's, we could say that the sentence lacks extension, and that its meaning is, as you state earlier (page 17) constituted purely intentionally.

But might not the fact that the meaning of this verbal construction is non-referential and is a purely intentional phenomenon, explain the poetic appeal of phrases such as (turning the

verb phrase I've used into a substantive), "the quiet shout" (or better—but why—"the silent scream") or "sleeping with fury." This might well explain why Chomsky's famous sentence so appealed to John Hollander that he made it into a poem.

But this brings us dangerously close to such hoary ideas as that a work of art is an isolated, autonomous, self-referring object, and these are claims that I, no more than you (I suspect) would want to endorse. Nonetheless, we can see how such an argument can get going: if the phrases of which a poem is composed have no extension, then the poem cannot be saying anything about the actual world. Moreover, because the poem (like Chomsky's famous sentence) evidently possesses some sort of meaning (this is my point for being somewhat expansive on the matter of the appeal of paradoxical descriptors and constructions that involve category errors) and yet the standards we evoke for assessing literal sense suggest that the poem is senseless, then we must conclude that the poetic meaning differs from the literary meaning.

Some way to block this argument seems necessary, and petitioning the statutes that warrant an object's status as work of art do not seem to me equal to the task. On the other hand I do believe these problems can be avoided by considering a work of art as an agent for generating experiences of a specific modality. If we adopt this idea, we can say that reference is not really a consideration when we consider key aspects of our experience of verbal constructions like "colour green ideas sleep furiously"; in considering the salient effect of such verbal constructions (I realize we need a criterion for determining which effects are salient and which are not, but I think such a criterion can be provided), all we need do is assess the effects of the aural patterns. Within such a framework, neither extensional nor intensional matters are salient considerations. More importantly, we can formulate explanations of this level of significance (effect) in terms that give full scope to the material status of the work, and do so without using any essentialist arguments (of which you seem—rightly, I believe—so sceptical).

2) Your manner of handling remarks that Plato offers in the Republic seem to treat the concept of use in a somewhat Wittgensteinian manner, as though the craftsman's knowledge of bit- or rein-making derived from empirical experience of the actual use that people make of reins or bits and so to divorce Plato's account of knowledge of "use" (or what Jowett translated as "use" in the passage you have quoted) from its essentialist basis.

This passage has a context and when its context is taken into account, we discover that it does not do the work that you wish it to—to say that we come to distinguish between genuine and spurious instances of certain items (reins, bits, banknotes, artworks) by understanding the genuine articles in their use. As I am sure you know, just prior to the passage that you quote Plato argues that what distinguishes the craftsman from the artist is that the craftsman has knowledge of the immaterial Form (the Idea) that defines that essence of the object he or she will create. Thus, at 596b–c Socrates states that the craftsman who produces couches or tables "fixes his eyes on the idea or form" but that the painter, like a mirror, simply reproduces the appearance of things, but not their reality. Plato likened the image that the painter makes with that which a mirror produces in order to indicate that the constitution—the being—of the painted image, like that of mirror image, lacks reality. The reason for alleging that these two sorts of images lack reality is that they are not fitted to serve the ends served by the actual objects: the image of the bed reflected in the mirror or the image of a bed in a painting is not adapted to having a person sleep on it as a real bed is. This adaptation of a material object to the end it serves is what Plato means by the material object "imitating" the form.

At stake here is the interrelation between essence and purpose as the Greeks defined it—the Greeks defined the essence of being by the end or purpose (what you have rendered as "use") for which the being was fitted to serve. Note that, despite Plato's having used in the passage you quoted such expressions as "the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience," that the purpose (or end) for which an object might be fitted would exist even if no object adapted to this purpose ever actually existed. Given that, it hard to see how such a view of use can be reconciled with a Wittgensteinian view that considers simply the actual use that we make of actually existing terms (objects).

3) With regard to claims on pages 28 and 29, concerning the historicity of our identification of works of art, I am left wondering whether your account can provide a strong enough account of the actual way that the canon comes to accommodate objects that initially seem anomalous to the presiding statutes governing art. Your model has can account for such change only externally, by demonstrating that there exists some sort of process by which objects are shown to possess a degree of polysemicity (since at present that is warrants an object's claim to being a work of art). This does not seem to me an adequate account of the process (which must be essentially pedagogical by nature). I don't imagine the process by which an object is validated as a work of art consists of exploring the domain of candidate objects and asking of each in turn whether or not it is a work of art. Rather something more vital and more visceral occurs in our lived encounter with a work, something which commands our attentions and imposes upon us an experience of unique, but undeniable sort.

I hasten to add the caution that this claim is not tantamount to the assertion that such experience is open to all people at all times. We know that there are works we just cannot open ourselves to, even though, as analysts, we know the work is exquisitely constructed and can even discuss details of its construction at considerable length. We know, too, that there are works we love to which we just cannot convince friends with whom we have shared many fine works to open themselves. The first sort of shortcoming in aesthetic appreciation suggests that we cannot lay the blame for all aesthetic incapacities on lack of knowledge (on one's possessing an inadequate background in poetics) while the second sort implies that we cannot impart knowledge concerning the aesthetic status of an object discursively. We know, too, that there are times when we are unprepared to open ourselves to the experience of even so commanding a work as Bach's *Die Kunst der Fugue*, when if we do try to listen to it, it just seems to grind on from one mechanical variation to the next to the next. This sort of impediment to appreciation suggests to me the importance of attention—to suggest that at times we are able to give a work the sort of concentration that will open it to us, and at other times we cannot. And what all this suggests to me is that something much more organic is involved than can be accounted for by any model that maintains that we determine whether or not a certain object is a work of art by determining whether its possess the features required by the prevailing statute that specifies what the requisite features of a work of art is.

I suggest that the most effective explanation explaining how initially anomalous seeming works end up being assimilated into the canon is to maintain that we make such determination case by case, and quite simply, by opening ourselves towards them and discovering whether the work has the capacity to engender that unique sort of experience, one that we call "aesthetic experience." Then, quite simply, when a large enough body of people over a long enough time span have experienced in a certain object in this way, we say that object is a work of art.

Certainly, your piece gave me much think about. Above all else, I enjoyed being invited to further consideration of the question of polysemicity. Perhaps some day we will have the opportunity to discuss these matters *viva voce*, in a seminar setting. Again, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to read it.

Sincerely,

R. Bruce Elder